
A robotic platform for the food & beverage industry.
The record is simple. One store in 2023. Two by 2024. Three by 2025. And in every quarter of 2026, total point-of-sale across all three stores has more than doubled year over year: +114% in Q1, +137% in Q2, and +176% through September 2 in Q3 — on comparable days.
Three stores, all performing, growth accelerating. For a hardware company, that’s the highest-signal evidence of capital efficiency we can offer: the money we deploy turns into revenue quickly, and the flywheel is already spinning. We built it on a shoestring. Give us abundant capital, and we add stores to a machine that’s already compounding.
At UIUC’s Advanced Digital Projects Lab.
Cozad New Venture Challenge, the Alexa Prize, then YC S19 Demo Day.
170 University Ave, Palo Alto.
Champaign 401 — same unit, new concept.
The next platform iteration — a plan, not a shipped product.
10 years robotics. B.S. EE, M.S. ECE — UIUC. Google hardware, 2018. Built the unit.
7 years in engineering & operations. M.Eng., UIUC Grainger. Runs the operation every day.
M.S., UC Berkeley. RoboCon world champion. Owns the robotics build.
Around them: the store crews who open the doors, work the bar, and tell us what broke.
Founded September 2018 at the University of Illinois; joined Y Combinator in 2019.
Seed-stage backer
Early backer
Transformative tech fund
Y Combinator cofounder · OpenAI founding member
Founder & CEO, Clutterbot
Problem
Industry pain point
Factories spent forty years engineering the repetition out of the work. Food service never adopted automation at all — the industry still runs on hands.
Published industry benchmarks — they describe the category, not Yummy Future's own results. IFR World Robotics 2025 (2024 data), manufacturing. Food service: no published density benchmark exists — that bar is our own estimate, not a cited figure.
Black Box Intelligence (TDn2K People Report) · DailyPay
National Restaurant Association · BLS food services (NAICS 72251)
The work is physically demanding, mentally numbing, and endlessly repetitive — the same shot, hundreds of times a day. The barista who knows the regulars, picks the music, and runs the store spends most of the shift on the half of the job that needs none of that.
Every new hire costs weeks of training, and at that rate the store never stops onboarding. Recruiting, training, and managing a crew that keeps walking out: it’s the biggest hidden cost behind the bar.
Quality depends on who’s on shift and how long the coffee has sat. One visit the espresso is dialed in; the next it’s been sitting in a pot for an hour. The product is never consistent — and when the crew is stretched, the service slips with it.
A specialty barista spends the whole shift repeating the same motion — pulling shots, steaming milk, whisking matcha. Yet that same person is why customers come back: they know the regulars, pick the music, run the store. The work that builds the brand is the work a machine can’t do.
So we amplify productivity with a robot that takes over the repetitive prep. That frees people to spend their shift on what only they can do — the welcome, the menu, the brand, the ownership. And freed-up people serve better: warmer, sharper, more consistent. That’s how a business stays competitive — not by running people harder, but by letting them do the work that makes service great.
Part-time jobs across three stores — the unit took the repetitive half of the shift, not the job. Same craft. Better job. Better business.
MAX is a complete robotic drink platform — not just a robot arm. Hardware, software, payments, inventory, and supply chain all come together in one system. Everything an operator needs to run a drink business, with no robotics expertise required.
The system pours coffee, matcha, and cocktails today, with tea already designed into the same arm. Up to 80 drinks an hour, consistently — no shifts, no turnover. It’s live in three stores today, the same system in all three.
We’re collecting real data and running real training on it — every drink poured in a live store is a training signal, not a demo. That’s the flywheel: more stores, more data, smarter robots. From there, MAX learns to plan automatically, recover from failures on its own, use more tools and more data — and clean and maintain itself — until the shop runs itself.
Forward statements describe plans, not guarantees. Actual outcomes may differ. See Form C and risk factors.
One robotic platform. Three stores.
Running at an annual pace of
| Company | Capital raised | Revenue annual run rate |
Net loss FY2025, consolidated |
Revenue per dollar raised |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Yummy Future |
$4.7M | $1.3M | $(1,217,816) | 28.3¢ |
Serve Robotics |
$673.8M | $12.95M | $(101.4M) | 1.9¢ |
Miso Robotics |
$167.3M | $0.51M | $(19,465,878) | 0.3¢ |
None of these companies is profitable, ours included. The question this page answers is a different one — how much investor money it takes to reach a given line of sales. Our loss is 1/16 the size of Miso’s and 1/83 of Serve’s — all three audited company-wide, year ended December 2025.
Hardware is supposed to be capital-hungry: tooling, inventory, locations — you spend big and hope the market shows up. We inverted that order. With limited funding, we opened stores one at a time, only when each one’s economics were already working, and let the registers prove the model before we ever asked for more. And sales are still doubling: every quarter of 2026 has come in more than double its 2025 quarter — Q2 by 137%, Q3 to Sep 2 by 176%.
@yfmatchahouse on Instagram · followers by August 12, 2026
New brand, new recipes, new visuals — same unit, same software. Concept to live: under a week.
Why we opened our own stores before selling a single unit
In this category, products rarely fail on engineering. They fail when a unit gets built, sold into a venue, and then sits idle — because nobody ever tested whether people would actually pay for the drink.
Against the capital already committed when the answer arrives. Illustrative shape, not measured values.
Demand is the last question asked.
Why the risk stays high
Years of capital, committed up front.
Nothing built yet has faced a paying customer.
The buyer carries the demand risk.
A purchase order is a buyer’s forecast, not a drinker’s decision.
The first real customer shows up here — or doesn’t.
By now, foot traffic, pricing and staffing are someone else’s to control.
The capital is spent; the unit sits idle.
The answer arrives with no capital left to act on it.
Demand is the first question answered, with our own money.
On our own books, not a buyer's.
Every dollar counted off the POS record.
A second concept in the same town; a second market on the other coast.
Operators come to a store that already earns.
The average ticket at our Champaign stores went from $6.16 in 2023 to $8.57 in 2026 — 39% more per order. Customers opted for higher-priced items, a clear recognition of our brand and product value. Monthly orders nearly doubled over the same window.
Both Champaign stores, POS orders incl. sales tax. 2023 starts in September.
Palo Alto is a completely new customer base for us — a mix of tourists and office workers, no campus, no semesters, no student base. It ran straight through summer and winter break, deployed, monitored, and operated 2,100 miles from our home base. And even at that distance, we keep launching new features and improving the product, iteration after iteration, without any issue.
Three locations live — Palo Alto, 170 University Ave; Champaign, 401 & 609 E Green St.
Plan to bring the first franchise locations online and start leasing units to operators.
Plan for franchise count to accelerate as network density compounds. The 25 LOIs are where it starts.
Grocery stores, coffee shops, pizza shops and the like — running businesses that came to us on their own.
A unit inside the business they already run — complementary, not a replacement for it.
We are in discussions with Sodexo and other vending groups. Nothing is signed and no party is committed.
All of it is non-binding interest — the 25 LOIs, the inbound operator conversations, and the discussions with Sodexo and other vending groups. Nothing has been signed and no party is committed to anything. Forward-looking — actual pace depends on operator readiness, capital, and execution. Today no Yummy Future unit is operated by a third party and no franchise or licensing revenue has been earned.
Proven. Now scaling. Three stores are live today on the same platform. Everything we do now is one thing: build the platform once, deploy it many times.
Every new store was a build-out: cost and timeline sat on the site, only spaces you’re allowed to renovate qualified, and each opening took months. Three stores proved the model — and showed us the ceiling of that path.
We flipped the company’s center of gravity, from operation-heavy to development-heavy. Branding, recipes and supply chain migrate to the operators who run each location; we keep the layer that compounds.
The core platform, packaged to drop into a venue’s existing setup. Built and tested on our line, delivered ready to place, connected to the site’s existing power and water. No renovation, no build‑out.
Every deployment makes the next one cheaper and faster: more locations, a sharper playbook, better unit economics; better economics mean more operators can say yes. Franchise continues on one channel, modules compound on the other — both on the same platform.
The page before this one is a plan. This is the work behind it — a two-arm development system on a bench in our lab, handling the cups and bottles a drink order is made of.
Two-arm development system · Yummy Future R&D lab · 2026‑09‑07 · the full take, 1 min 53 sec, silent
Our own development lab. Not a store, not a customer site. No hardware like this is installed at any location today.
The whole take, start to finish, silent — the handling a drink order is made of. Twice a person reaches in and repositions the cups by hand. That is a development bench.
Not a product, not a shipping date, not a claim that this runs unattended. The three live stores run on the platform we already shipped — not on this.
Development footage recorded in Yummy Future’s own lab on 2026‑09‑07 — one continuous take, played here in full, one minute fifty‑three seconds, nothing cut. Two things were done to it and nothing else: the audio was removed, and the frame is cropped at the bottom so the operator’s workstation at the edge of the bench is out of shot. A person reaches in by hand twice during the take; this is a development bench, and nothing on this page is a claim that this hardware runs unattended. The hardware shown is an in‑development prototype: it is not installed at any location, not offered for sale, and not part of the operations behind any figure in this deck. Whether and when anything like it ships is a forward‑looking plan, not a commitment, and actual outcomes may differ. See Form C and risk factors.
We've shown what it can do. We're just starting. Come build the rest with us.
Early bird applies to the first $100K invested. Investor perks at $1K, $5K, $10K, $25K.
See Form C and risk factors before investing. Forward statements describe plans, not guarantees.
Americans drink ~500 million cups a day. 66% of adults drink it daily — more than any other beverage. Out-of-home coffee alone is a $77B market that resets every morning.
Today, quality and convenience are a trade-off. The best cup in any neighborhood is rarely the nearest one — people still detour, queue, and drive for it. The coffee within arm’s reach — the lobby machine, the hotel kiosk — is coffee people tolerate, not crave. Every morning, millions choose between their time and their taste.
Robotic productivity kills that trade-off. When a unit makes specialty-grade drinks for the cost of a machine, quality stops costing distance: the product moves to the customer. A genuinely great cup, brewed steps from the lobby, the gate, the office floor — even the doorstep — instead of a detour away. Convenience and quality of life, not one at the expense of the other.
Before sunrise
Every departure
Ten till nine, daily
18 hours a day
Then expand where the habit already is: gyms, hospitals, universities, transit hubs, residential lobbies — every place people settle for a bad cup today because the good one is too far. We don’t create the demand. We remove the distance.
Every venue picture on this page is a concept render of the unit in that setting — not an installed location, not a signed site, not a shipping product. No venue shown has agreed to anything. Market sizing only. The figures stated above are published industry statistics; sources are still to be cited on this page. Yummy Future’s share of any of these markets is not projected here. Not committed revenue. See Form C for full discussion.
The deal is one sentence: our unit stands in a corner the venue already pays for, and we split what it sells. Nothing gets built. Nobody gets hired.
Shift cover is what kills it. $200,000 is about 64 orders a day — two people at the peak, one either side, seven days. $171,000 of payroll and upkeep before a single cup.
Ours is not free either — restocking, cleaning and service run $20,000 a year at this volume, drawn in the right-hand bar. An eighth of the shift bill, and nothing else separates the two columns.
Backup photography for Q&A — not part of the main narrative. Every frame here was taken in a store we operate; none of it is licensed stock.
Financial figures live on the traction and trajectory pages. Nothing on this page is a claim.